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Factoring attitudes towards armed conﬂict risk into
selection of protected areas for conservation
E. Hammill1,2, A.I.T. Tulloch1, H.P. Possingham1,3, N. Strange4 & K.A. Wilson1

The high incidence of armed conﬂicts in biodiverse regions poses signiﬁcant challenges in
achieving international conservation targets. Because attitudes towards risk vary, we assessed
different strategies for protected area planning that reﬂected alternative attitudes towards the
risk of armed conﬂicts. We ﬁnd that ignoring conﬂict risk will deliver the lowest return on
investment. Opting to completely avoid conﬂict-prone areas offers limited improvements and
could lead to species receiving no protection. Accounting for conﬂict by protecting additional
areas to offset the impacts of armed conﬂicts would not only increase the return on
investment (an effect that is enhanced when high-risk areas are excluded) but also increase
upfront conservation costs. Our results also demonstrate that ﬁne-scale estimations of
conﬂict risk could enhance the cost-effectiveness of investments. We conclude that achieving
biodiversity targets in volatile regions will require greater initial investment and beneﬁt from
ﬁne-resolution estimates of conﬂict risk.
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he establishment of effective protected areas remains at the
heart of global conservation efforts1,2. Many terrestrial
ecosystems are now so modiﬁed by humans that protected
areas represent ﬁnal refuges for threatened species3. However,
the effectiveness of protected areas may be undermined when
managers have insufﬁcient resources to mitigate threats such as
illegal logging4 and poaching5, alterations to environmental
conditions6 and armed conﬂict7,8. The threat of armed conﬂict
is of particular concern given the high occurrence of conﬂict in
biodiversity hotspots9. Impacts of conﬂict include harvesting of
valuable animal parts to fund paramilitaries10, reliance on fauna
and ﬂora for subsistence11, and collateral damage from military
operations12. In addition to impacting biodiversity, conﬂict
may also damage park infrastructure and imperil staff13–15.
Despite evidence of conﬂict-related damage to species and
protected areas, the effect of conﬂict remains complex, and
in some cases could even beneﬁt biodiversity by creating
exclusion zones16 or hindering extractive industries17.
At a minimum, systematic conservation planning combines
data on conservation features (for example, species’ ranges)
and management costs to identify areas for protection18,19.
Typically, it is assumed that once designated, protected areas
will mitigate threats to biodiversity. As conﬂict has the potential
to undermine protected areas20, factoring conﬂict risk
(a combination of the probability of a conﬂict occurring and its
impact on protected areas) into the initial planning stages is
crucial to ensure that conservation funds are optimally allocated.
Conservation managers may face severe consequences if
projects fail, and this fear of failure may lead to suboptimal,
overly risk-averse management practices21,22. It is therefore
necessary to quantify the conservation outcomes of different
attitudes towards risk, so managers may tailor their practices to
improve management outcomes and justify their actions.
Initial attempts at systematic conservation planning utilized
coarse national-scale cost and biodiversity data23. The use of
national-scale data is inefﬁcient, as biodiversity and conservation
costs are not uniformly distributed within nations. Improvements
in data collection made ﬁne-scale conservation planning
possible24,25, yet conﬂict risk still tends to be reported at a
national scale26–28. However, most conﬂicts take place at the intranational level28, meaning localized areas experience various levels
of conﬂict risk (often elevated along international borders29,30).
Fine-scale estimates of conﬂict risk would have the beneﬁt of
accounting for within-nation spatial variability in conﬂict, thereby
increasing the spatial precision of conservation planning.
To understand how conﬂict has affected conservation spending
historically, we correlated domestic spending and international
aid31 with national estimates of conﬂict risk26 and national-scale
biodiversity31 (calculated by summing the fraction of the range
for each species range within a nation31). In addition, we
investigated correlations between biodiversity and conﬂict risk9.
We then investigated four strategies for future protected area
investment that reﬂect different attitudes towards conﬂict risk. In
the ﬁrst strategy, conﬂict risk is ignored and investment decisions
are based on biodiversity and cost data alone (henceforth termed
‘conﬂict-ignorant’). Under the second strategy, areas with
conﬂict-risk estimates above a designated threshold are
excluded from selection (henceforth termed ‘conﬂict-avoiding’).
The third strategy explicitly accounts for conﬂict risk when
selecting protected areas (henceforth termed ‘conﬂictaccounting’). Under this conﬂict-accounting strategy, high-risk
areas are avoided when others are available, and in the absence of
alternatives, additional areas are selected to increase the chance
that sufﬁcient areas are protected to meet the conservation
targets32. For example, if a conservation feature existed in 10
planning units that have a 25% chance of being impacted by
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conﬂict, protecting six planning units would give a 96.2%
of reaching a target of protecting 30% of its range (binomial
distribution, chance of three or less failures from six
binomial trials where the chance of failure in one trial is 25%).
The ﬁnal strategy (henceforth termed as ‘conﬂict-sensitive’)
combines conﬂict-avoiding and conﬂict-accounting. Areas with
a conﬂict-risk level above a threshold are unavailable (as for
conﬂict-avoiding), and conﬂict risk in the remaining areas is
accounted for (as for conﬂict-accounting). For example, if the
maximum-risk threshold were 35%, a location with a 30% risk of
conﬂict would remain available for selection, but this risk would
be accounted for in the manner described above.
We used Africa as a test case to estimate how incorporating
conﬂict risk affects conservation outcomes. Africa currently
has B2.2 million km2 (7%) of its landmass protected33
(Supplementary Fig. 1), which is substantially less than the
global average (13%). Across all African mammals, the mean
proportion of species’ ranges in protected areas is 17%, and
420% of species have o5% of their ranges protected34.
Inadequate protection compromises the survival of many iconic
mammal species, highlighting a need to increase the extent and
effectiveness of protected areas35,36. However, many African
nations have low ‘Peace Scores’26, calculated using levels of
domestic and international conﬂict, level of national discord and
level of militarization26. Africa’s low peace scores are inﬂuenced
by its history of serious incidents including civil war (Democratic
Republic of the Congo, DRC) and genocide (Rwanda), many of
which have directly impacted conservation efforts. During the
Rwandan genocide, for example, the Akagera National Park was
reduced to 30% of its original size37. The impact of conﬂict not
only reduces the size of protected areas but can also reduce their
effectiveness at conserving species, illustrated by conﬂict
increasing poaching in central Africa17. At the end of 2014, it
was estimated that 24 armed conﬂicts were ongoing in Africa38.
We used 100 runs of the software package Marxan to select
protected area networks and incorporated conﬂict risk using the
four different strategies. A grid was superimposed over Africa,
dividing the continent into 10 km2 planning units. The amount of
each conservation feature within each planning unit was calculated
along with costs of purchasing and maintenance. Each planning
unit was also assigned a conﬂict risk using two different methods:
national-scale estimates from published sources (presented in the
text26, Supplementary Note 3 and ref. 39), and a planning unitspeciﬁc estimate predicted from local historical armed conﬂicts30
(see Methods section, Supplementary Note 1, Supplementary
Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 2 for details).
For each conservation feature, we set a target of including 30%
of their existing distribution in a future protected area network
(a rule-of-thumb recommendation for terrestrial species40).
The conservation importance of each planning unit was
determined by its selection frequency within the 100 Marxan
runs. In addition, for each investment strategy, the run that
met all conservation targets at the least cost (representing
the ‘best’ solution) was used in later analyses. To evaluate the
performance of the protected area networks, we used Monte
Carlo simulations to estimate which planning units in the
protected area network would be impacted by conﬂict during a
5-year management period. We compare the performance of the
protected area networks using the planning units deemed
unaffected by conﬂict. To quantify performance, we reported
the number of conservation targets met, the cost of the protected
area network and the return on investment (in terms of
conservation targets met per $billion expended). We show that
the conﬂict-accounting and conﬂict-sensitive strategies are the
best performing, and this performance is enhanced by ﬁne-scale
conﬂict-risk data.
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Results
Historical patterns of conservation spending. We found
no correlation between national-scale conﬂict risk26 and
international conservation aid31 (Spearman’s rank correlation,
rs ¼  0.025, P ¼ 0.86, n ¼ 48; Fig. 1a) or between conﬂict
risk and domestic spending on conservation31 (rs ¼  0.052,
P ¼ 0.73, n ¼ 48; Fig. 1b). However, we found a signiﬁcant
and
international
relationship
between
biodiversity31
31
conservation aid (rs ¼ 0.30, P ¼ 0.038, n ¼ 48; Fig. 1c), and
between biodiversity and domestic conservation spending
(rs ¼ 0.41, Po0.01, n ¼ 48; Fig. 1d). We also found signiﬁcant
correlations between biodiversity and conﬂict risk when
using national-scale risk estimates26 (rs ¼ 0.52, Po0.001,
n ¼ 48; Fig. 1e) and ﬁne-scale estimates (t ¼ 72.29, Po0.001,
n ¼ 48; Fig. 1f).

National-scale versus ﬁne-scale risk estimates. Fine-scale
estimates of conﬂict risk indicated substantial within-country
variation (Fig. 2a,b), and illustrated the correlation between
conﬂict risk and biodiversity (Fig. 2a,c). The use of ﬁne-scale data
increased the spatial precision with which conﬂict-risk estimates
could be incorporated into planning decisions and altered the
selection frequency of the planning units (Fig. 3). Importantly,
ﬁne-scale estimates prevented the exclusion of entire nations
when high-risk areas are avoided (Fig. 3c,g), and have the
potential to improve return on investment (Fig. 4e,f).
Performance of the four strategies for incorporating risk.
Under a conﬂict-ignorant strategy, many selected planning units
would be in high-conﬂict-risk areas, regardless of whether
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Figure 1 | Correlations of risk estimate against conservation spending and biodiversity. We found no correlation between national-level risk and total
spending (a) or domestic spending (b) on conservation. Both total conservation spending (c) and domestic conservation spending (d) are correlated with
national-scale biodiversity (calculated by summing the fraction of each species’ range present within a nation). High levels of national-scale biodiversity are
correlated with high levels of national-scale conﬂict risk (e). At the scale of the 10-km2 planning units, we found a signiﬁcant correlation between conﬂict
risk and number of conservation features present in a planning unit, with high-conﬂict-risk planning units tending to contain many endangered mammals
(f). Conservation spending estimates were acquired from a database compiled by Waldron et al.31. National-scale estimates of conﬂict risk were acquired
from the Institute for Economics and Peace26. Data in a–e represent ranks, and data in f are the values for each planning unit and are shown in grey so the
trend line is visible.
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Figure 2 | Continental scale risk and biodiversity patterns. (a) Risk of conﬂict from national-scale estimates26. (b) Fine-scale conﬂict-risk layer derived
from the geographical locations of previous conﬂicts and the severity of the incident30, with the inset identifying the horn of Africa to the Congo
Basin displayed in Fig. 3, one of the most conﬂict-prone but biodiverse regions of Africa (c) Mammal species richness index measured as the proportion of
236 threatened mammals that have part of their range in each planning unit.

national-scale or ﬁne-scale risk estimates are used
(compare Fig. 2a,b with Fig. 3a). Using national-scale estimates of
conﬂict risk, up to one in three selected planning units would
have a conﬂict risk 425%, a value that drops to one in four
when ﬁne-scale risk data are used. As a consequence of many
selected planning units being in areas of high conﬂict risk, this
strategy would fail to achieve almost half of the conservation
targets (o30% of the current distribution protected; Fig. 4c,d).
Although the initial upfront cost of the protected area network
would be low (Fig. 4c,d), the low number of targets met would
lead to a poor return on investment for the conﬂict-ignorant
strategy (Fig. 4e,f).
When a conﬂict-avoiding strategy is adopted, at low-risk
thresholds (o10%), fewer targets are met than under a conﬂictignorant strategy, regardless of whether national-scale or
ﬁne-scale conﬂict-risk data are used (Fig. 4a,b). When nationalscale estimates of conﬂict risk are employed, and maximum
tolerable risk is set between 10 and 45%, there are minimal
differences compared with the conﬂict-ignorant strategy in terms
of the number of targets met, despite an increase in cost
(Fig. 4a,c). Crucially, when national-scale risk estimates are used,
a large number of conservation features are predicted to receive
zero protection as they occur exclusively in high-conﬂict-risk
nations. For example, even when the national-scale maximum
tolerable risk is set at 40%, the entire ranges of at least 31 species
are unavailable for selection (Fig. 4g), a value that is greater still
when using alternate estimate of risk from Hegre et al.39
(Supplementary Note 3). Conversely, using ﬁne-scale data
under a conﬂict-avoiding strategy results in all species receiving
at least some protection when the maximum tolerable risk is
Z25% (Fig. 4g). Regardless of whether national-scale or ﬁne-scale
4

estimates of conﬂict risk are used, the protected area network
does not perform better than a conﬂict-ignorant strategy in terms
of cost, targets met or return on investment (Fig. 4c–f).
Adopting a conﬂict-accounting strategy would meet the
majority (B95%) of conservation targets (Fig. 4a,b), irrespective
of whether national-scale or ﬁne-scale estimates of conﬂict risk
are employed. This increase in the number of targets met is
achieved through a combination of opting for lower-risk planning
units and increasing the number of planning units selected.
This also increases costs compared with conﬂict-ignorant and
conﬂict-avoiding strategies (Fig. 4c,d). However, the return on
investment is improved compared with the conﬂict ignorant and
conﬂict-avoiding strategies (Fig. 4e,f), as the increase in targets
met is proportionally greater than the increase in cost. Under a
conﬂict-accounting strategy, the use of ﬁne-scale data would
increase the number of targets met and the overall return on
investment (Fig. 4e,f).
The highest overall return on investment could be achieved
under a conﬂict-sensitive strategy using ﬁne-scale conﬂict-risk
data (Fig. 4f), when the maximum tolerable risk is between 30 and
55%. This high return on investment occurs because as the
maximum tolerable risk increases, the number of targets met
increases more rapidly than the overall cost (Fig. 4b,d). In
contrast, selecting areas for protection using national-scale risk
data could result in some features receiving no protection if the
maximum tolerable risk is low, in the same manner as under a
conﬂict-avoiding strategy (Fig. 4g).
Analysis of uncertainty in conﬂict-risk estimates. When the
upper 95% conﬁdence limit of the ﬁne-scale risk estimate is used
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Figure 3 | Selection frequencies of planning units under different risk
strategies. Panels show the most conﬂict-prone region of the African
continent, including the eastern border of the DRC and the Horn of
Africa. The selection frequency of planning units based on biodiversity
and cost data alone (a) (conﬂict ignorant). The selection frequency
of planning units when areas with 435% risk of conﬂict are avoided
(conﬂict avoiding) using national-scale (b) and ﬁne-scale (c) risk data.
The selection frequency of planning units when risk was explicitly
incorporated (conﬂict accounting) using national-scale (d) and ﬁne-scale
(e) risk data. The selection frequency of planning units when areas with
435% risk of conﬂict were avoided, and risk was accounted for in the
remaining areas (conﬂict sensitive) using national-scale (f) and ﬁne-scale
(g) risk data.

to identify areas for protection, the calculated number of targets
met and overall return on investment for conﬂict-accounting
and conﬂict-sensitive strategies are still greater than when the
national-scale estimates of risk are employed (Supplementary
Note 2 and Supplementary Figs 3 and 4). The protected
area network generated using an alternative national-scale
estimate of conﬂict risk39 performs poorest overall in terms
of number of targets met or return on investment for all four
risk strategies (Supplementary Note 3 and Supplementary Figs 5
and 6).

Discussion
Historical conservation spending patterns suggest that high
biodiversity nations have been favoured regardless of the conﬂict
risk, indicating a willingness to invest in conﬂict-prone nations
when rewards are high9. At the local level, however, managers
may face severe repercussions for failed projects, leading to
risk-averse behaviour41. Examples from the United States would
suggest that agencies have a low tolerance towards risk of
failure22,42, instead favouring suboptimal actions with low risk21.
Our results show that this attitude of avoiding high-risk areas or
projects is not optimal as a conﬂict-avoiding strategy performed
poorly in terms of targets met and return on investment. We
instead propose that managers should be accepting of risk, and
account for that risk, to maximize conservation outcomes.
Our spatial prioritization analysis seeks to identify areas that
would protect 30% of each conservation feature’s range for the
minimum overall cost (a ‘minimum set’ problem19). When
conﬂict risk is not factored into the selection process, there is no
motivation to incorporate planning units over the 30% required
to meet the target. For many features, the loss of a small number
of planning units may be sufﬁcient for the feature to have o30%
of its current range protected, meaning that the target is missed.
Accordingly, being conﬂict ignorant is the poorest performing
strategy, in terms of number of targets met and overall return on
investment.
Choosing to avoid conﬂict-prone areas would lead to the
majority of conservation features not receiving adequate
protection. The negative effects of areas being excluded are
exaggerated when national-scale estimates of conﬂict risk are
used. When species are endemic to a single, conﬂict-prone nation,
excluding that nation from a protected area network would lead
to these species receiving zero protection. For example, if
maximum tolerable risk was set at o40%, several iconic
conservation features, including the eastern lowland gorilla
(Gorilla beringei graueri), would be essentially abandoned.
Adopting a conﬂict-accounting strategy would lead to a B50%
increase in the cost of establishing the protected area network
compared with a conﬂict-ignorant strategy. However, the B50%
cost increase generates a protected area network where almost all
of the conservation targets are met (a B100% increase), increasing
return on investment. The conﬂict-accounting strategy may
increase overall conservation success through the following two
mechanisms: (1) high-conﬂict-risk areas are avoided where
possible; and (2) additional areas containing conservation features
are protected to offset losses predicted to be incurred if conﬂicts
occur32,43. However, many conﬂicts occur in close proximity to
areas of high population density44, meaning that sufﬁcient
additional areas may be unavailable. At the local scale, managers
may be aware of areas that are unavailable for protection. In a
future investigation, deeming these planning units unavailable
would force the software to include planning units elsewhere19.
When national-scale conﬂict risk estimates are used, a strategy
of avoiding the most conﬂict-prone regions and accounting for
risk in the remainder (conﬂict-sensitive) yields a similar return on
investment to conﬂict-accounting. Conversely, when ﬁne-scale
risk estimates are used, between risk thresholds of 30% and 55%,
a conﬂict-sensitive strategy yields a greater return on investment
than conﬂict-accounting. Although a conﬂict-sensitive strategy
yields the highest return on investment, it also leads to the
exclusion of high-risk areas. This exclusion of high-risk areas may
be appealing to conservation managers wishing to limit the
exposure of staff to conﬂict, but means any conservation feature
existing predominantly in high-risk areas may be abandoned
when maximum tolerable risk is low. The decision to opt for a
conﬂict-accounting versus a conﬂict-sensitive strategy therefore
depends on whether the goal is to achieve the highest return on
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Figure 4 | Financial and biodiversity consequences of different attitudes towards risk. The x axis relates only to conﬂict-avoiding and conﬂict-sensitive
strategies. Different lines represent different attitudes. Conﬂict ignorant represents the outcomes of basing conservation decisions only on biodiversity and
cost data. Conﬂict avoiding represents the consequences of avoiding areas with greater than a maximum allowable risk. Under conﬂict accounting, the risk
of conﬂict is incorporated into planning decisions along with biodiversity and cost data. A conﬂict-sensitive strategy represents a combination of the
previous two attitudes to risk, areas with a conﬂict risk greater than a maximum tolerable level are avoided, and risk of conﬂict is accounted for in the
remaining planning units. (a,b) Number of conservation targets met. (c,d) Total cost of the protected network in billions of USD. (e,f) Overall return on
investment in terms of conservation targets met per billion USD. (g) Number of targets predicted to receive no protection under the two strategies where
upper limits are set on maximal tolerable risk (conﬂict avoiding and conﬂict sensitive). Data show mean estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals in all
panels except c,d and g, where no error estimates were produced as the data represent the output from the ‘best’ protected area network, and are not
affected by probabilistic losses due to conﬂict.

investment or to save the most species, and be inﬂuenced by the
risk tolerance of conservation investors and managers22.
For the two strategies that account for risk (conﬂict-accounting
and conﬂict sensitive), the ﬁne-scale risk estimate is predicted to
outperform national-scale estimates in terms of targets met, cost
6

and returns on investment (even when the upper 95% conﬁdence
limit of the risk estimate is used; Supplementary Note 2 and
Supplementary Fig. 4). National-scale estimations of conﬂict risk
incorporate many parameters including institutional consistency
and economic openness45. However, incorporating national-scale
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calculations into systematic conservation planning assumes that
conﬂict risk is homogenous within a nation, an assumption that is
likely to be false. For example, the DRC is historically among the
most unstable nations in Africa26,45, but conﬂict risk within the
nation is highly heterogeneous. The majority of conﬂicts occur
around the eastern border30 (Fig. 2b), leaving a relatively safer
area to the west30. The DRC also contains some of Africa’s
highest numbers of mammalian species (Fig. 2c)46. High-priority
conservation areas in countries such as the DRC could be
excluded from a future protected area network if investment
decisions were based on national-scale risk data, potentially
incurring consequences for both economic development and the
achievement of international biodiversity targets.
The results we present do not include the social impacts of
conﬂict, either the direct impact on local people or the potential
loss of ecosystem services47. Conﬂict can reduce a society’s access
to potable water48 and damage soils49, potentially increasing
pressure on remaining ecosystem services. The inclusion of
ecosystem service targets, when planning for protected areas, may
therefore be important in conﬂict regions, where resources are
likely to be scarce50.
Our measures of conﬂict risk do not explicitly estimate the
impact of conﬂict on conservation features; however, information
on the differential vulnerability of all species to the impacts of
conﬂict could be included if this information is developed for
lesser known species22,51. We have therefore assumed that should
a protected area be impacted by a conﬂict, it will lead to the loss
of all conservation features that inhabit that area. This
pessimistic, ‘worst case’ assumption increases the chances of
conservation targets being met when information is imperfect.
We acknowledge that the dynamic nature of conﬂicts means
they may have disparate effects on conservation7,17. For example,
rebel activity may require locally sourced natural resources to
fund conﬂict activities52, thereby placing a higher demand on the
local environment than an externally funded inter-state war.
Our results will be sensitive to the differing impacts of
various conﬂicts; however, the sensitivity analysis we present
(Supplementary Note 2) demonstrates that when the conﬂict-risk
estimates are increased or decreased (analogous to differences in
impact), the pattern of performance for the four risk strategies
remains the same. We therefore suggest that although the
quantitative outcome of a conﬂict-accounting and conﬂictsensitive risk strategies will be sensitive to the impact of
different conﬂicts, both strategies would still outperform
conﬂict-ignorant and conﬂict-avoiding strategies.
Our analyses utilized estimates from multiple sources that
employed different techniques to estimate conﬂict risk. In the main
text, we used the ‘Peace Score’, a national-scale estimate produced
by the Institute for Economics and Peace26. The Peace Score is
generated using a ﬁve-point scale (determined by expert opinion)
for 23 different indicators, divided into three domains (ongoing
conﬂict, national harmony or discord and national militarization).
The Peace Score therefore uses a substantial volume of
information, likely making it a robust metric. The second
national-scale estimate of conﬂict risk extracted from Hegre
et al.39 (Supplementary Note 3) uses a national-scale logistic
model, with predictors such as population size, infant mortality,
ethnic antagonism and neighbourhood characteristics39. While
these national-scale estimates of conﬂict risk may be robust owing
to the volume of information used, their lack of spatial precision
leads to difﬁculties in planning at the sub-national level.
Conversely, our ﬁne-scale estimate of risk used far fewer
metrics (history of local incidents, severity of local incidents and
time since last local incident), but demonstrates the value of
ﬁne-scale data in a similar manner to increased precision
of biodiversity and cost data19,24.

Our results demonstrate the value of incorporating the risk
of armed conﬂict into systematic conservation planning and
illustrate the importance of local-scale data. We hope that
protected area managers solicit estimates of the potential conﬂict
risks at the local scale, and incorporate this information using
the principles we have demonstrated to maximize conservation
outcomes. We would hope our results increase the conﬁdence
of managers, governments and the public to accept some level
of risk while undertaking conservation actions. This willingness
to accept risk will allow conservation decisions to be based
on likely outcomes, rather than a potentially suboptimal fear
of failure21.
Methods
Data on historical patterns of conservation spending. We obtained species
distribution maps from previously published sources31,53, then calculated two
metrics for biodiversity. The ﬁrst national-scale metric summed the fractions of
each mammalian species’ range that exist within each nation31 (Fig. 1a–e). The
second, local-scale metric quantiﬁed the number of endangered mammals that had
part of their range within a planning unit (Fig. 1f)53.
Identiﬁcation of future protected areas. We identiﬁed priority areas for future
conservation investment under the four different risk strategies using spatial
prioritization19. A 10-km2 grid was superimposed over Africa, producing 335,694
planning units available for investment. We identiﬁed 357 conservation features
comprising Africa’s 121 ecoregions54, and the ranges of 236 threatened African
mammal species (same data as used to calculate local-scale metric for biodiversity
in Fig. 1f (ref. 53)). Our conservation goal was to represent 30% of each feature in
the protected area network, representing the recommended minimum for
terrestrial ecosystems40. Risk of conﬂict was incorporated using two different
methods. We obtained published estimates of conﬂict risk at the national scale26,39,
and also calculated risk at the resolution of the 10-km2 grid using historical conﬂict
data30. As locations with a history of conﬂict are predicted to have a higher future
risk26, we produced a logistic model of predicted risk within a planning unit based
on local conﬂict history. Since the effect of conﬂicts can be felt in surrounding areas
through movement of conﬂict actors or refugees11, we created 30 km ‘impact zones’
around incidents, and planning units within the impact zone were deemed to have
experienced the conﬂict. We used the conservation planning software Marxan55 to
identify areas for conservation under each different risk strategy. Below we go
through each of the steps necessary to perform the analysis in term.
Calculating estimated land costs. Each planning unit was assigned a ﬁnancial
cost (USD) value that included the following three core components: the cost of
purchasing the land, the foregone agricultural revenue over 5 years and the cost of
protected area management53.
Spatial data for conservation targets used in spatial prioritization. Spatial data
were obtained describing the distributions of Africa’s 236 terrestrial mammal species
classiﬁed as 4threatened or data-deﬁcient according to the IUCN red list of
endangered species56, and Africa’s 121 unique ecoregions (data are available at
https://disturbance.s3.amazonaws.com/EcoregionalRollup.zip). To determine the
biodiversity value of each planning unit, we calculated the proportion of the total area
of each conservation feature represented in each planning unit. When a planning unit
was selected to be part of the protected area network, it contributed in meeting the
protection target, which is 30% of the current extent of that conservation feature19.
Conﬂict data and risk calculation. The deﬁnition of ‘risk’ we employed
incorporates the following two dimensions: the chances a conﬂict incident will
occur and the loss or damage associated with the event22. Data on conﬂict risk were
obtained through two different methods. First, we sourced national-scale estimates
from the scientiﬁc literature26,39, we focused on the more recently compiled data
from the Institute for Economics and Peace26 as opposed to the data from Hegre
et al.39. Second, we used geo-referenced data on previous conﬂict incidents30 at the
sub-national level. The geo-referenced conﬂict data allowed us to estimate conﬂict
risk at the planning unit scale (10 km2), and were obtained from the Armed
Conﬂict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)30. Under the assumption that
following an incident people are likely to move away, we assumed that conﬂict
incidents affected the planning units close to where they took place, and included
30 km ‘impact zones’ around each conﬂict incident. This distance was chosen as it
is greater than the average distance travelled by paramilitary groups and refugees
per day57. We opted to use the ACLED database as opposed to the UCDP/PRIO58
database owing to its high level of spatial precision and number of data points.
Many different deﬁnitions of what constitutes a conﬂict exist, including the
Toronto Group’s deﬁnition of 41,000 battle deaths, with 50% casualties per side,
and the conﬂict classiﬁcation used by Hegre et al.39, where incidents with 25–999
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battle deaths per year, are considered minor, while 41,000 deaths represent major
conﬂicts39. These deﬁnitions could, however, overlook many of the small,
local-scale conﬂicts that may be important from a conservation perspective.
We built a statistical model to calculate the planning unit-speciﬁc conﬂict risk
using local history of conﬂicts. To calibrate the model, we used the data from 10
years of the ACLED database (1999–2008) to ‘predict’ risk in the subsequent 5
years using the presence/absence of an incident in each planning unit between 2009
and 2014 as a response variable. The model ﬁtted a logistic curve using the
following three signiﬁcant descriptive variables (bounded by the years 1999–2008):
the number of previous incidents in that planning unit (probability of future
conﬂict, logistic regression, z ¼ 37.44, n ¼ 335,694, Po0.001), the number of
fatalities (likely impact of conﬂict, z ¼ 25.51, Po0.001) and years since the last
incident (probability of future conﬂict, logistic regression, z ¼ 25.54, n ¼ 335,694,
Po0.001). The logistic model generated probabilistic outputs (conﬂict-risk
estimates between 1 and 100%) for each planning unit. The model accounted for
35% of the total variation in the data (calculated using McFadden’s pseudo-R2).
Full parameter estimates for the logistic model and relationships between the
descriptive parameters and conﬂict risk are given in Supplementary Note 1,
Supplementary Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 2. Following parameterization of
the logistic model, we used conﬂict data from the years 2005 to 2014 to predict the
risk of conﬂict incidents during the next 5 years (2015–2019). We are aware that
our logistic model likely represents an oversimpliﬁcation of the factors that can
lead to armed conﬂicts as well as their likely damage; however, the simplicity of the
model allows it to be applied to the entire continent.
Spatial prioritization. Systematic conservation planning was conducted using the
conservation decision-support software Marxan24,55. For all conservation features,
we used the recommended target of 30% of the current extent of the feature40.
Planning units were designated as ‘existing protected areas’ if 450% of the area of
a planning unit already fell within a protected area, and these areas were forcibly
included in the protected area network. Marxan was run 100 times, and the
frequency with which available planning units were selected within the 100 Marxan
runs indicated their relative priority (Fig. 3).
Monte Carlo simulations to estimate return on investment. In order to
estimate the return on investment yielded by each of the conﬂict-risk strategies, we
used Monte Carlo simulations to estimate how many conservation targets were
predicted to not be achieved. We assigned a random number between 1 and 100 to
each planning unit in the protected area network. If the random number assigned
to the planning unit was less than its estimated conﬂict-risk percentage, that
planning unit was deemed ‘lost’. For each conservation feature, the total area of its
distribution present in the remaining planning units (not ‘lost’) was calculated and
compared with the conservation target. If 30% or more of the conservation feature’s original area was contained in the remaining planning units, the conservation
target was deemed met. For the best protected area network selected under each
risk strategy (out of the 100 Marxan runs), we repeated this procedure 1,000 times.
The 1,000 simulations enabled us to produce a distribution of the estimated total
number of targets met under each attitude towards risk, allowing the reporting of
medians and conﬁdence limits. To estimate return on investment, the predicted
performance of the protected area network (number of conservation targets met)
was divided by the cost of the protected area.
Sensitivity analysis. Because our ﬁne-scale estimate of conﬂict risk has an error
estimate associated with it, we re-ran the analyses using the upper and lower
conﬁdence intervals. Continental-scale risk estimates using the upper and lower
conﬁdence limits, and the results of using these estimates in terms of number of
conservation targets met, cost and return on investment are given in
Supplementary Note 2 and Supplementary Figs 3 and 4.
The national-level estimates of conﬂict risk we obtained from published sources
did not contain an error calculation26. We therefore re-ran the analysis (identiﬁed
areas for protection under the four different risk strategies and used Monte Carlo
simulations to quantify the success of these protected areas) using another set of
data from another online source39. Full results are given in the Supplementary
Note 3 and Supplementary Figs 5 and 6.
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